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Wolcott: Are Smartphones like Footlockers or Crumped up Cigarette Packages
ARE SMARTPHONES LIKE FOOTLOCKERS OR CRUMPLED UP CIGARETTE
PACKAGES? APPLYING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE TO

SMARTPHONES IN SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

One evening Larry, a lawyer, is driving home from the office after a
particularly long and taxing day. As Larry makes a turn, his BlackBerry begins
to ring, and while reaching to retrieve it, he swerves into a lane of oncoming
traffic, narrowly missing another car. Officer Pat, a patrolman, witnesses Larry's
erratic driving and decides to stop Larry's vehicle.
When Officer Pat approaches the vehicle, Larry is visibly shaken, and his
eyes appear red and bloodshot from a long day at work. Believing that Larry
might be drunk, Officer Pat asks Larry if he was on his way home from a nearby
bar. Larry becomes irate at this allegation, partly because of the lack of sleep and
partly because Larry thinks the officer recognizes him and is giving him a hard
time. Larry is a well-known plaintiffs attorney who has represented various
individuals in suits against the police department. Unfortunately for Larry,
reckless driving is an arrestable offense, and Officer Pat has also had a very long
day. Officer Pat, fearing for his safety and wanting to quiet Larry, places him
under arrest.
After placing Larry in the back of the patrol car, Officer Pat returns to the
vehicle and sees a BlackBerry lying in the passenger's seat. Officer Pat wonders
if Larry was not drunk but instead was reaching for his BlackBerry. Because
texting while driving is unlawful in the state, Officer Pat picks up the device to
see if Larry had received or sent any text messages at the time of the near
accident. Instead of a text message inbox, an email from one of Larry's partners
at the firm is open on the home screen. Worst of all, it is an email about an
upcoming civil suit against the city police for allegedly assaulting an arrestee.
The search incident to arrest doctrine allows officers to search containers in
the space within an arrestee's immediate control, and in the context of the
automobile, officers may search when it is reasonable to believe that the officer
may find evidence of the arrestable offense in the vehicle.1 Unfortunately for
Larry, it appears as if Officer Pat's search of Larry's BlackBerry was within the
lawful bounds of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
Although smartphones2 allow lawyers to practice from any place in the
world and increase productivity, the search incident to arrest doctrine can turn

1. United States v. Majette, 326 F. App'x 211, 213 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009)).
2.
PC Magazine defines smartphone in the following manner:

A cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet access. Smartphones
provide digital voice service as well as any combination of text messaging, e-mail, Web
browsing, still camera, video camera, MP3 player, video player, television and organizer.
In addition to their built-in functions, smartphones have become application delivery
platforms, turning the once single-minded cellphone into a mobile computer.
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this invaluable tool into a traveling liability. The amount of information stored
on and accessible by a smartphone is astonishing.4 Many large firms link
BlackBerries to internal servers, allowing lawyers to remotely access firm-wide
files on the go.5 Thus, for many lawyers it might seem disconcerting that a police
officer can search an arrestee's smartphone incident
to arrest. Under current case
6
law, however, this seems to be the logical result.
Part II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the development of the
Fourth Amendment and the search incident to arrest doctrine generally. Part II
also includes a section discussing United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, as
well as a section that discusses the application of the search incident to arrest
doctrine in South Carolina. Because many courts have held that smartphones and
their cell phone predecessors are containers, Part III of this Comment discusses
the evolution of the Fourth Amendment in relation to containers specifically.
Part III also includes a section on the origin of the container analysis, the origin
of the container analysis as applied to cell phones and smartphones, and finally a
section that applies the origin of the container analysis to computers, laptops, and
smartphones. Lastly, Part IV offers a solution for courts facing the situation of an
arrestee challenging a smartphone search under the search incident to arrest
doctrine in South Carolina.

PC MAGAZINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia

term/0,2542,t=Smartphone

&i=51537,00.asp (last visited May 22, 2010).
3.
See RES. IN MOTION LTD., BLACKBERRY CASE STUDY: LAW FIRM IMPROVES
PRODUCTIVITY AND BOTTOM LINE USING BLACKBERRY AND ONSET TECHNOLOGY 1 (2004),

http://www.onsettechnology.com/Data/Uploads/RIM%/20-%/2OMintz Case Study.pdf (stating that a
BlackBerry equipped with email enhancement, billable hour software, and document reading
software can create up to four hours of extra productivity per lawyer per week). As a result of
increased productivity, 500 lawyers could generate an extra $40,000 in revenue per month. Id.
4. There are a number of BlackBerry applications that may be helpful to lawyers, including,
among many others, databases of federal and state laws, full copies of federal procedural rules and
the U.S. Constitution, a legal dictionary, software to manage and create documents, remote desktop
software that allows remote access to a desktop via a BlackBerry, and software that allows billable
hours tracking by project. See Nicole Black, BlackBerry Apps for Lawyers, THE DAILY RECORD,
(Rochester, N.Y.), July 20, 2009, available at http://nylawblog.typepad.com/files/dr-7.20.09.pdf.
CAN

5.
See BRUCE MACEWEN, LAWYER RESPONSIVENESS: How SMALL AND MID-SIZED FIRMS
USE MOBILITY TO BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE IN THE FACE OF HIGH CLIENT

EXPECTATIONS
11
(2006),
http://na.blackberry.com/solutions/industry/professional/Lawyer
ResponsivenessWhitepaper.pdf ("Having remote access to documents via a document management
system-is clearly [the] number one [most important feature of smartphones to enhance lawyer
responsiveness] (cited by 4 6 .1% of all respondents), especially if access to 'personal/network,
drives,' an additional 33.3%, is aggregated with that response.").
6. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV.
27, 28-29 (2008).
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II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE

A.

PROTECTIONS

AND

THE

United States Supreme Court Jurisprudenceand the Search Incident to
Arrest Doctrine Generally
1.

The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment and the
7 Move Away from
the Chimel Principleof ParticularJustification

The text of the Fourth Amendment generally protects citizens from
warrantless searches and seizures by guaranteeing the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
However, there are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement. 9 In South
Carolina, the courts recognize the search incident to arrest doctrine as an
exception to the warrant requirement. 1° It is also one of the most common
exceptions used by law enforcement officers in avoiding the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement."
The seminal case for the modem search incident to arrest exception is
Chimel v. California.12 In Chimel, police officers arrested a suspect in his home
for burglary. 13When the officers asked the suspect if they could search his
home, he declined, but they advised him that "'on the basis of the lawful arrest"'
they could perform a search without his consent. 14 The officers subsequently
searched the entire house, including "the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop. 15 In some rooms the police conducted only a cursory search, but in
the master bedroom and sewing room, officers asked the arrestee's wife to move

7.
For an excellent summary of Chimel and its progeny, see Gershowitz, supra note 6, at
32-36.
8.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9.
Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement include search incident to
arrest, hot pursuit, stop and frisk, automobile exception, plain view doctrine, consent, and
abandonment. State v. Moore, 377 S.C. 299, 309, 659 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State
v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 456-57, 462 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1995)).
10. Id.
11. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 32 (noting that the search incident to arrest doctrine is
"perhaps the most common rationale for police to search without a warrant").
12. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
13. Id. at 753.
14. Id.at 753-54.
15. Id.at 754.
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contents of drawers from side to side so that the officers could view any potential
items that came from the burglary. 16 To determine if this search was
unconstitutionally broad, the United States Supreme Court outlined
circumstances in which police officers may search a suspect incident to a lawful
arrest. 17 The Court stated that officers may search an arrestee's person to find
weapons that the arrestee could use against an officer and to prevent the arrestee
from destroying or concealing evidence.18 Moreover, the Court held that officers
may conduct a search of "the area 'within [the arrestee's] immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. ' 19 Because the search of the
home went beyond the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate
control, the Court held that the search was unconstitutionally broad.2 °
Subsequently, in United States v. Robinson,21 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether police could search closed containers on
an arrestee's person. During a pat-down search conducted incident to an arrest
for driving without a license, a police officer felt something in Robinson's
pocket but could not determine what it was. 23 The arresting officer reached into
Robinson's pocket, pulled out a "'crumpled up cigarette package,"' and found
heroin inside it.24 On this set of facts, the Court held that an officer conducting a
search incident to a lawful arrest may open and search through items on the
arrestee's person, including a closed container.25 Thus, the Court created a clear
26
and easy to understand rule, but in so doing, it eroded Fourth Amendment
protections by holding that a full search following a lawful custodial arrest
"requires no additional justification,, 27 as the Court seemed to require in
2
Chimel. 1
The erosion of Fourth Amendment protections continued in New York v.
Belton.29 In Belton, a police officer stopped a vehicle because the driver was
speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and

16. Id.
17. Id. at 762-63.

18. Id. at 763. Destroying or concealing evidence is the particularly relevant exception to the
smartphone inquiry, as it is highly unlikely that a person could use a smartphone as a weapon, in
any typical sense of the word.

19. Id.
20. See id. at 768.
21. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. See id. at 236.
23. Id. at 220, 223.
24. Id. at 223.
25. See id. at 236 (holding that the inspection and removal of the heroin from the cigarette
package was lawful as a search incident to arrest).
26. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 34.
27. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
28. See supranotes 17-20 and accompanying text.
29. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
30. Id. at 455.
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viewed a suspicious envelope; consequently, he arrested the occupants of the
31
vehicle. While the passengers were standing in an area away from the vehicle,
the officer searched the passenger compartment, found a jacket, unzipped a
pocket of the jacket, and found cocaine. 32 The United States Supreme Court
praised the "straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced"
articulated in Robinson but observed that there was no straightforward rule to
guide police officers on the "proper scope of a search of the interior of an
automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants. 33 In creating a
rule applicable to the vehicle context, the Court stated, "Our holding today does
no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and
problematic context., 34 In order to provide police officers with a bright-line rule,
the Court held that officers may search the entire passenger compartment of a
vehicle when the occupant is under arrest and away from the vehicle35and that this
search of the vehicle may also include any containers in the vehicle.
While the Court in Belton had already moved far away from the original
rationale in Chimel-to prevent arrestees from obtaining a weapon or destroying
evidence-the Court stretched the yrinciple of particular justification even
thinner in Thornton v. United States. In Thornton, a man in a vehicle aroused a
37
police officer's suspicions by avoiding driving near the officer's car.
Consequently, the officer checked the38plates on the vehicle and discovered that
they were issued for a different car. Before the police officer could stop the
vehicle, however, the suspect pulled into a parking lot, exited the automobile,
and walked away from it before the officer approached him. 39 After approaching
the suspect, the police officer conducted, with the suspect's consent, a pat-down
search and discovered marijuana and cocaine in the suspect's pocket. 4 0 After the
officer arrested the suspect for drug possession, the officer proceeded to search
the passenger compartment of the suspect's vehicle, discovering a handgun
under the seat. 41 Unlike the suspects in Belton, the arrestee was neither in the
vehicle when the police42began the arrest procedure nor in the vehicle when he
encountered the officer. Nonetheless, the Court held that a full-scale search of
the passenger compartment incident to the arrest of a "'recent occupant' of a
vehicle" is constitutional.4 3 The Court reasoned that police officers need a "clear

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.at455-56.
Id.at 456.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460 n.3.
Id.at 460.
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
Id. at 617-18.

38.

Id. at 618.

39. Id.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
See id.
at 617-18.
Id.at 623-24.
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rule, ... not depend[ent] on differing estimates of what items [are] or [are] not
within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment." 44 In Thornton, the erosion
of Fourth Amendment protection was at a high point-the Court almost
completely replaced the limited Chimel rationales
and principle of particular
45
justification for the sake of a bright-line rule.
2. A Return to the Narrow Chimel Exceptions in the Vehicle Context?
In Arizona v. Gant,46 the United States Supreme Court's most recent
discussion of the search incident to arrest doctrine in the vehicle context, the
Court returned to the rationales in Chimel and rejected a broad reading of
Belton.47 The case involved a suspect who was arrested, handcuffed, and placed
in the back of a locked police car. After officers secured the suspect and locked
him in the back of the patrol car, officers searched the suspect's car and found a
jacket with cocaine in a pocket.4 9 The facts are somewhat similar to those in
Belton, but in this case, the Court declined to follow the broad generalization
underpinning Belton 50 and the result that followed in Thornton-avehicle search
would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle,
even if the passenger compartment of the vehicle was not within an area over
which the recent occupant could exercise immediate control. 51 The Court
explained its departure from this rule:
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown
that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is
unfounded.
We now know that articles inside the passenger
compartment are rarely "within 'the area into which an arrestee might
reach,"' and blind adherence to Belton's faulty assumption would
authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare
decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.
Thus, the Court returned to rationales outlined in Chimel, stating that
"[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the

44.

Id. at 623.

45. See id. at 622-24.
46. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
47. See id. at 1719 ("Under this broad reading ofBelton, a vehicle search would be
authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the
vehicle's passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search. To
read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant's arrest would thus
untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception ... .
48. Id. at 1714.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1719.
51. Id. at 1718.
52. Id. at 1723 (citation omitted) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
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arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of the arrest., 53 While the Gant decision demonstrates a shift away from
Belton and Thornton and a return to Chimel, the case affords a person little
protection in the vehicle context if a container is within her reaching distance or
if it is reasonable for the arresting officer to believe that the container may
contain evidence of the arresting offense.54
3.

The Role of the Expectation of Privacy and the Evolution of the
FourthAmendment

The expectation of privacy is an implicit rationale behind the Fourth
Amendment protection against warrantless searches.55 In order for the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable or warrantless searches to arise,
there must be a justifiable expectation of privacy on the part of the individual in
the area that the authorities search. 56 In determining whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated and whether the search incident to arrest doctrine
applies, courts often examine whether a person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy over the area that the person claims should be protected.57 If the person
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over the area, then the Fourth
58
Amendment and its protections are not even implicated.
The United States Supreme Court first stated the modem expectation of
privacy underlying the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States,5 9 in which,
unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI placed an electronic listening and recording
system on the outside of a telephone booth from which he placed his calls. 60 The
issue in the case was whether the buggin6i of the phone booth constituted a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. In analyzing the issue, the United
States Supreme Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places . . . .[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 6 2 In a concurring

53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) ("[T]he State's intrusion into a
particular area... cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area is one in which
there is a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."' (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
56. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 357-58 (1974).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(discussing whether a defendant who voluntarily surrendered to law enforcement had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his BlackBerry that he brought with him).
58. See Class, 475 U.S. at 112.
59. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60. Id. at 348.
61. See id.at 349-50.
62. Id.at 351-52.
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opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the current two-prong standard used to
determine if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The first prong is
subjective and requires that a person exhibit a belief of an actual expectation of
privacy, while the second prong is objective and requires that the expectation be
one that society recognizes as reasonable. 64
65
However, in United States v. White, Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion,
moved away from the subjective prong of the test that he articulated in Katz,
partly for fear of the government using technology to become an "Orwellian Big
Brother., 66 In White, the government wanted to introduce evidence obtained
from an electronic listening device on an informant who engaged in
conversations with White about narcotics. 67 Law enforcement officers were
listening to these conversations through a radio transmitter attached to the
device. 8 Based on advances in technology, as evidenced by the use of an
electronic listening device placed on the informant, Harlan began to see a
potential problem with the test that he articulated in Katz. 69 The obvious problem
was that the government can influence the citizenry's subjective expectation of
privacy. 0 For example, if the government routinely conducts warrantless
searches of smartphones, then it would be likely that a citizen would no longer
have a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of her smartphone,
because she would have been made aware that police officers routinely conduct
such searches. As a result, Justice Harlan proposed a new test to determine when
a warrant must be obtained before police may conduct a search. 71 He stated that
courts should balance "the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of
its impact on the individual's sense of security . . . against the utility of the
conduct as a technique of law enforcement.", 7 2 Where the intrusion into the
security and liberty interests of the individual are great, courts should require law
enforcement officers to obtain warrants before conducting searches.7 3

63.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

64. Id.
65. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
66.

Id. at 770, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

67. Id. at 746-47 (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 747.
69. See id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. ("The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.").
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 786-87.
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B. Applying the Search Incident to Arrest Exception in South Carolina
A recent and illustrative South Carolina search incident to arrest case is State
75
v. Freiburger.74 The case involved a suspect who was stopped for hitchhiking. 76
During a pat-down search incident to arrest, the officer discovered a revolver.
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated, "Generally, a warrantless search is
per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 77 However, the court noted that there are a
number of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment protection and among them is
the search incident to arrest exception.78 Citing Chimel, the court stated, "The
rationale for such a warrantless search is that it is permissible incident to a lawful
arrest because of legitimate concerns for the safety of the officer and to prevent
the destruction of evidence by the arrestee. 7 9 In analyzing the facts of this case
in light of the original Chimel rationale, the court concluded that the pat down
search was lawful and "necessary to ensure [the officer's] safety."80 Freiburger
is a fairly recent case, decided long after the United States Supreme Court began
81
its move away from the Chimel principle of particular justification in Robinson.
Nevertheless, the Freiburgercourt still rooted its reasoning in Chimel's original
justifications and thus remained true to the principle of particular justification. 2

74. 366 S.C. 125, 620 S.E.2d 737 (2005); see also Porter v. Ashmore, 421 F.2d 1186, 1190
(4th Cir. 1970) (holding that a search of a house for gambling paraphernalia was reasonable as a
search incident to arrest where the crime for which the defendant was being arrested was related to
gambling); Cocklin v. Hagan, No. 9:06-1475-PMD-GCK, 2006 WL 3489264, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 4,
2006) (holding that the search of a vehicle incident to an arrest for burglary was valid); State v.
Cannon, 336 S.C. 335, 339, 520 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1999) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973)) (holding that once the police officer lawfully arrested the respondent for criminal
domestic violence, he was entitled to search the respondent incident to arrest); State v. Dupree, 319
S.C. 454, 456, 462 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1995) (citing State v. Bailey, 276 S.C. 32, 35-36, 274 S.E.2d
913, 915 (1981)) (recognizing search incident to arrest as a valid exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement); State v. Moore, 377 S.C. 299, 309, 659 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ct.
App. 2008) (citing Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456-57, 462 S.E.2d at 281) (recognizing search incident to
arrest as a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
75. Freiburger,366 S.C. at 130, 620 S.E.2d at 739.
76. Id.The officer "testified that, although Freiburger had not been arrested at the time of the
pat down search, he was going to be arrested for hitchhiking, or taken back to the jail."). Id. at 133,
620 S.E.2d at 741. The court subsequently held that the pat down search was lawful as a search
incident to arrest. Id.
77. Id.at 131, 620 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456, 462 S.E.2d at 281).
78. Id.at 132, 620 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Dupree, 319 S.C. at 456, 462 S.E.2d at 281; State v.
Ferrell, 274 S.C. 401, 409, 266 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1980)).
79. Id. at 132, 620 S.E.2d at 740-41 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
80. Id.at 133,620 S.E.2d at 741.
81. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.... [W]e hold that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is ...a 'reasonable search' under [the
Fourth] Amendment.").
82. See Freiburger,366 S.C. at 132-33, 620 S.E.2d at 740-41.
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However, in State v. Muquit,8 3 the South Carolina Court of Appeals took a
very broad view of the search incident to arrest doctrine. In that case a defendant
was incarcerated at a detention center after being arrested for an armed
robbery.8 4 After the arrest, police officers obtained a search warrant for the
clothes the suspect wore during the robbery, which were being held at the jail.85
The trial court found that the search warrant was invalid because the warrant
failed to list the jail as the place to be searched .86 The judge, however, concluded
that the seizure of the clothes was valid, stating that the search warrant was
unnecessary. 87 The appellate court held that the search of the defendant's
clothing was valid incident to arrest.88 In support of this holding, the court cited
United States v. Edwards89 and stated that a person's expectation of privacy is
greatly reduced when he is arrested and his property transfers to the custody of
the state, even when a substantial amount of time has elapsed between an arrest
and a search. 90
At the South Carolina federal appellate court level, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently examined Arizona v. Gant in United
States v. Majette,91 a case in which the defendant was pulled over for a traffic
offense and arrested for driving on a suspended license.92 The officer placed
Majette in the back of a patrol car and searched his vehicle.93 During this search,
the officer discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia, and Majette was
subsequently charged with a drug related offense.94 The court undertook a
straightforward application of Gant, noting that "police may search incident to
arrest only the space within an arrestee's immediate control" in order to stop the
arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying evidence. 95 Additionally, the
court stated that in the automobile context, an officer can search the vehicle if the
officer reasonably believes that the vehicle might yield
96 evidence related to the
offense for which the officer is arresting the defendant. Applying this reasoning

83. 381 S.C. 114, 671 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2009); see also State v. Moultrie, 316 S.C. 547,
551-52, 451 S.E.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a search that occurred immediately before
arrest qualified as a valid search incident to arrest, even though typically a search incident to arrest

occurs after arrest).
84.
85.
86.

Muquit, 381 S.C. at 116-17, 671 S.E.2d at 644-45.
Id. at 117, 671 S.E.2d at 644-45.
Id. at 117, 671 S.E.2d at 645.

87. Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 118-20, 671 S.E.2d at 645-46.
415 U.S. 800 (1974).
Muquit, 381 S.C. at 119, 671 S.E.2d at 646 (citing Edwards,415 U.S. at 806-07).
326 F. App'x 211 (4th Cir. 2009).

92. Id. at 212 (noting that the original reason for the stop was "impermissibly dark window
tint").

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 213 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1712-13 (2009)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96. Id. (citing Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714).
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to the facts of the case, the court held that the search was unreasonable because
Majette was handcuffed and in the back of the patrol car during the search.97
Furthermore, the court found that the officer could not have reasonably
believed
98
that the vehicle contained evidence of Majette's license suspension.
III. THE

EVOLUTION OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE AS

APPLIED TO CONTAINERS-CRUMPLED UP CIGARETTE PACKAGES TO THE
SMARTPHONE

As discussed above, the search incident to arrest doctrine applies in many
settings. Generally speaking, the analyses in these settings are similar with
respect to searches of items found on the suspect's person or in the suspect's car.
Typically searches conducted incident to arrest are limited to the arrestee's
person or an area within her immediate control and are based on the need to
protect the officer from hidden weapons or prevent the destruction of evidence.
However, as noted in Part II, this principle of particular justification was
stretched thin in the cases that followed Chimel but was strengthened somewhat
in Gant. With respect to smartphones, however, many courts have drawn
analogies between cell phones and containers,99 which are potentially subject to
different treatment under the search incident to arrest doctrine. The next sections
discuss the origins of container searches, their application to smartphones, and
the potential consequences in South Carolina courts.
A.

Origins of the Container

Among many others, containers discussed in United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence have included a crumpled up cigarette package on the arrestee's
person,100 a footlocker that had just been loaded into an automobile's trunk,101 a
suitcase in the trunk of a taxicab, 102 and a brown paper bag in the trunk of an
arrestee's vehicle. 10 3 These containers typically have fallen into one of two
categories: containers immediately associated with the person of the arrestee,
such as a wallet' ° 4 or an address book, 10 5 and personal property located near an

97.

Id. (citing Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19).

98. Id.
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
101. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1977), overruled in part by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
102. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979), overruled in part by Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565. The Acevedo Court overruled Chadwick and Sanders only to the extent they required a warrant
to search a closed container in an automobile. See 500 U.S. at 579. Thus, outside of the context of
an automobile search, they are presumably still good law.
103. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 801 (1982).
104. See United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Robinson, 414
U.S. 218) (holding a search of a wallet found on an arrestee's person valid incident to arrest).
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arrestee, such as luggage. 10 6 The two types of containers have received different
treatment from the United States Supreme Court.
United States v. Robinson established the rule that when police officers
discover a container, such as a crumpled up cigarette package, on an arrestee's
person during a search incident to arrest, the officers may open it without any
additional justification. 10 7 Specifically, in Robinson, the United States Supreme
Court held that an officer conducting a search incident to lawful arrest can open
and search through items on the arrestee's person, even those in a closed
container. 10 8 Containers found on an arrestee's person-like the crumpled up
cigarette package-have come to be known as "containers immediately
associated with the person of an arrestee." 10 9
In contrast, in United States v. Chadwick,110 the United States Supreme
Court took up the issue of how to treat containers located near the person of an
arrestee.111 In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents suspected that a footlocker
carried by two men onto a train leaving San Diego for Boston contained
narcotics. 112 When the men arrived in Boston, federal agents were waiting and
released a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted the agents to the presence of
marijuana in the footlocker.
The suspects loaded the footlocker into the trunk
of a waiting automobile and were subsequently arrested.! 14 The agents took
possession of the car and drove it to the federal building where they opened the
footlocker, which was locked with a regular trunk lock and a padlock.115 The
officers discovered marijuana inside of the footlocker,' 16 and at trial, the
defendant moved to have the marijuana evidence suppressed.1 17 The Court held
that Fourth Amendment protections extend to containers outside of the home and
that by placing personal affects inside of a double-locked footlocker, the suspects
manifested an expectation of privacy no different than if they had locked the
doors of their home.1 1 8 Lastly, the Court stated that there was no exigency

105. See United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Molinaro, 877
F.2d at 1346-47) (analogizing a search of an address book to the search of a wallet on an arrestee's
person and holding the search of the address book as valid incident to arrest).
106. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13, 15 (holding that a footlocker is personal property not
immediately associated with the person of an arrestee).
107. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
108. Id.

109. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.5(a), at 176 (3d ed. 1996) ("However, the Robinson search-incident-to-arrest
authority was deemed to extend to containers on the person and containers such as a person which
are 'immediately associated' with the person." (footnotes omitted)).
110. 433 U.S. 1 (1977), overruledin part by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
111. Id.at4, 15.
112. Id. at3.
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id.at4.
115. Id. at 4-5.
116. Id. at5.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 11.
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justifying the search because the search was remote in time and place from the
arrest and the police officers had reduced the footlocker to their exclusive
control. 119 Therefore, the Court
found that the warrantless search of the
120
footlocker was unreasonable.
In a similar case, Arkansas v. Sanders,12 1 the United States Supreme Court
extended its finding of an increased expectation of privacy in footlockers and
luggage.122 In that case, police officers received a tip from an informant about a
suitcase in the trunk of a car.123 Subsequently, the officers stopped the car on a
highway and searched the suitcase. 124 Prosecutors argued that a search of the
suitcase was permissible because the suitcase was in an automobile. 125 However,
the Court held that the expectation of privacy in a suitcase taken from a car on a
highway is no different than the expectation described Chadwick.12 The Court
reasoned that the purpose of a suitcase is' 127
to "serve as a repository for personal
items when one wishes to transport them."
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has held that containers that fall
into the category of containers immediately associated with the person, such as
the cigarette package in Robinson, may be searched automatically incident to
arrest without additional justification. In contrast, containers that fall into the
category of personal property near an arrestee, such as the luggage in Chadwick
and Sanders, may be searched to preserve evidence or protect the officer.
However, the Court has held that searches incident to arrest of footlockers and
luggage are often unreasonable because it is easy for police to secure and
preserve their contents. Moreover, individuals have a heightened expectation of
privacy in the contents of footlockers and luggage.
B. Smartphones as Containersin South Carolina
Whether the warrantless search of a smartphone is constitutional could be
determined by how South Carolina courts categorize a smartphone-that is,
whether smartphones are analogous to footlockers or to wallets. If a South
Carolina court finds that a smartphone is analogous to a footlocker, as in
Chadwick, then the search will be subjected to more stringent requirements. This
would require that an officer be able to articulate some reasonable rationale
related to a chance that evidence in the phone could be destroyed or that a search
was needed to protect the safety of the arresting officer. 128 If the officer chooses

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.at 15.
Id.at 15-16.
442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled inpartby California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
Id.at 764-65.
See id.at 755.
Id.
Id.at 762.
Id.at 764-65.
Id.at 764.
See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009).
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to seize the smartphone, she would have to obtain a warrant before conducting a
search if no other exigent circumstances exist. 129 However, if a South Carolina
court finds that a smartphone is analogous to a wallet or address book, it would
seem that police may search a smartphone incident to arrest without additional
justification.
Two cases illustrate the different results that follow based upon the
categorization of a cell phone as analogous to a footlocker or a wallet. In United
States v. Finley,13 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld a district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress call records
and text messages retrieved from his cell phone. 131 In reaching its decision, the
court reasoned that a cell phone or pager is personal property "immediately
132
associated" with the arrestee,
thus treating cell phones and pagers similar to
133
books.
wallets or address
However, in United States v. Park,134 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted a defendant's motion to suppress a
warrantless search of his cell phone.135 In reaching the decision, the court applied
Chadwick's reasoning. 136 The court then compared laptops to modem cell
phones because, like laptops, "modern cellular phones have the capacity for
storing immense amounts of private information. 1 37 The court stated that
persons have lesser privacy interests in address books or pagers found on their
persons, which contain less personal information. 138 Because the search of the
cell phone's contents was not based on exigent circumstances, the court held that
the search did not qualify under the search incident to arrest exception and stated
139
that the officers should have obtained a warrant before conducting a search.

129. See id.
130. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
131. Id.at 260.
132. Id.at 260 n.7 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)); see also
United States v. Brookes, No. CRIM 2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124, at *3 (D.V.. June 16, 2005)
(upholding a search of a cell phone and analogizing a pager and cell phone to a wallet or address
book); United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005)
(citing United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993)) (upholding search of cell
phone and analogizing it to a wallet or address book as items immediately associated with the
person of the arrestee).
133. See United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 287-88 (D. V.I. 1995) (citing United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973)) (holding that a pager falls under the Robinson
progeny rather than the Chadwick progeny and stating that based on the Robinson progeny, courts
have held searches of wallets and address books to be valid).
134. No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
135. Id. at *5, *12.
136. Id.at *6, *8.
137. Id.at *8.
138. Id.at *9.
139. Id.at *8.
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1. Early Pagers and Cell Phones as Wallets and Address BooksLowered Expectation of Privacy
Even when courts have held that a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of a cell phone, the courts have found that the search
incident to arrest exception trumps the privacy expectation. In United States v.
Chan,14 a federal district court analogized a pager to a personal address book
and stated that individuals have a "reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of [a] pager's memory., 141 The defendant argued that the court should2
follow Chadwick, but the court declined to recognize Chadwick as controlling.1
The court based its holding on the fact that in Chan the search of the pager was
not remote in time and space to the arrest and the pager was seized as a result of
a search of the defendant's person, whereas in Chadwick, the footlocker was
seized from the trunk of a car, and the search of the footlocker was remote in
time and space.1 3 Consequently, the court in Chan held that the warrantless
144
search of the pager was permitted under the search incident to arrest doctrine.
In another early electronic container case, United States v. Ortiz,1 4 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit justified a warrantless
search of a pager. 146 The court based this finding on the fact that incoming calls
could destroy stored phone numbers.1 7 Consequently, when early pagers are
analogized to address books, they fit comfortably within an original Chimel
rationale-a warrantless search is permitted to preserve evidence.
The courts
in Chan and Ortiz made two important proclamations: the search incident to
arrest doctrine trumps an expectation of privacy in older electronic containers,
and early 14electronic
containers should be treated no differently than any other
9
container.
2.

Shaky Ground. The Modern Cell Phone-ContainerAnalogy

In terms of functionality, early cell phones were similar to an address book
or letter in an envelope found on an arrestee's person. For example, text
messaging is similar to sending and receiving a letter, and reading a text message

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535-36 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1977)).
Id.
Id.at 536.
84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996).

146. Id. at 983-84.
147. Id.at 984 ("Because of the finite nature of a pager's electronic memory, incoming pages
may destroy currently stored telephone numbers in a pager's memory. The contents of some pagers
also can be destroyed merely by turning off the power or touching a button.").
148. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
149. See Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984; Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534-36.
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is analogous to reading the contents of a letter. 150 However, the function analogy
becomes harder to draw with a modem cell phone's capabilities because access
to a text message inbox or outbox on a cell phone is analogous to readin
hundreds of short letters or even eavesdropping on a real-time conversation.
Consequently, the function seems similar-both are forms of written
communication-but the sheer volume of real-time communication is
incomparable. Moreover, most Americans likely would have a heightened
expectation of privacy in the context of a real-time conversation through text

messaging, 152 making the analogy between a modem cell phone and a wallet or
address book tenuous.
In a representative modem cell phone text messaging case, United States v.
Finley, the Fifth Circuit treated text messages like the contents of any other
container 153 because the cell phone was an item immediately associated with the
arrestee's person. 54 After a controlled drug purchase, police searched Finley,
found a cell phone, searched the phone, and found text messages related to drug
use and trafficking. 155 Finley argued that the search of his cell phone was
unlawful and that his cell phone could be seized but not searched. The court
held that "Finley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call records and
text messages on the cell phone and that he therefore ha[d] standing to challenge
the search. 157 However, the court concluded that the search was lawful, citing
the rationales articulated in United States v. Robinson and New York v. Belton

150. At the most basic level, a letter and a text message are both a written form of
communication exchanged between two people.
151. Text messages are exchanged in real time and responses are often received in a matter of
seconds, as would occur in an in-person conversation or a conversation on the phone, whereas a
letter is sent through the mail, which results in a much more delayed response. Moreover, people
send far more text messages per day than letters. According to a Nielsen Mobile Survey, "[flor the
second quarter of 2008, U.S. mobile subscribers sent and received on average 357 text messages per
month," which constitutes almost 12 text messages per day. Marguerite Reardon, Americans Text
More Than They Talk, CNET NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-1004825794.html. Moreover, "American teenagers sent and received an average of 2,272 text messages per
month in the fourth quarter of 2008, according to the Nielsen Company-almost 80 messages a day,
more than double the average of a year earlier." Katie Hafher, Texting May Be Taking a Toll, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2009, at D1.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2007) ("Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can
record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and
text ....
").
153. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
154. See id.at 260 & n.7 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)).
155. Id. at 253-54. For example, one text message read, "'Call Mark I need a 50,"' a likely
reference to purchasing $50 worth of some narcotic. Id. at 254 n.2. Another read "' So u wanna get
some frozen agua,"' a likely reference to 'ice,' a common term for methamphetamine." Id.
156. Id.at 260.
157. Id.at 259.
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and in effect holding that the text messages in 158
an electronic container are no
different than the contents of any other container.
Another illustrative modem cell phone case is United States v. Wurie. 59 In
Wurie, police observed a cocaine transaction in a parking lot, arrested Wurie for
distributing crack cocaine, and seized two cell phones upon searching Wurie at
the police station.
Officers examined the call logs of one of the cell phones,
and when the phone rang, they flipped it open and observed a "'wallpaper"' of a
young woman and a baby.1 61 The police then found the phone number associated
with "'my house"' in the call log. 62 They traced the number through a Web site,
which gave them an address. 63 After obtaining a search warrant, officers
searched the residence and found crack cocaine, a gun, drug paraphernalia, and
cash. 164 On appeal, Wurie sought to suppress the evidence resulting from the cell
phone information. 65 Using Finley as an example, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts stated, "It seems indisputable that a
person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell
phone." 166 The court further noted that many other courts have held that the
search incident to arrest exception applies to searches of the contents of cell
phones. 167 Focusing on the limited search of Wurie's cell phone and citing cases
where wallets were searched incident to arrest, the court held that the search was
reasonable, stating that there was no difference between a warrantless search of a
cell phone and a warrantless search of other containers.
The court suggested
an analogy between wallets and cell phones, and also held that a limited and
cursory search of a cell phone was reasonable and that the
expectation of privacy
169
was trumped by the search incident to arrest exception.

158. See id.at 259-60 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1973)).
159. 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009).
160. Id. at 106.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 106-07.
164. Id.at 107.
165. Id.at 105.
166. Id. at 109.
167. Id. (citing United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008); United
States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008); United States
v. Lottie, No. 3:07cr5lRM, 2008 WL 150046, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2008); United States v.
Dennis, No. 07-008-DLB, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007); United States v.
Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277 (D. Kan. 2007); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp.
2d 1291, 1304 (D. Kan. 2003)).
168. Id. at 110 ("I see no principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless search of a cell
phone from the search of other types of personal containers found on a defendant's person that fall
within the... exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirements.").
169. Id.at 109-10.
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C. A New Analogy: Smartphones as Luggage, Computers, or Laptops-A
HeightenedExpectation ofPrivacy
More recently, courts have recognized that one of the problems with
extending the search incident to arrest exception to smartphones is that "the line
between cell phones and personal computers has grown increasingly blurry. 1 70
Moreover, courts recognize that smartphones are very different from early cell
phones and hold greater amounts of personal information.171 A smartphone now
resembles a mobile computer more than an early cell phone, and while courts
have often applied the search incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones, 172 they
have not applied it to computers. 173 Moreover, when comparing the type and
volume of information contained on a smartphone to that stored on a computer
and considering the heightened level of expectation of privacy in information
stored on a computer, 174 the similarities are obvious. 175 Implicit in this rationale
is the fact that a laptop is more analogous to luggage than to a wallet, because
searching a laptop may reveal the same type and volume of highly personal
information that would be revealed by searching luggage. As a result, if a court
analogizes a smartphone to a laptop, it is proper that the smartphone also be
analyzed under the footlocker and luggage analysis. Thus, in order to predict
how a smartphone should be analyzed, it is important to examine how computers
are currently treated.

170. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007).
171. Id. at *8 & n.6 (distinguishing "modern cell phones" from earlier cell phones and taking
note that the phones in this case were T-Mobile Sidekick Is, with capabilities such as email,
texting, address books, cameras, instant messaging, and Internet access). The court also noted that
"[i]ndividuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their most
private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text." Id. at *8.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
although the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone, the
search of his phone was lawful); Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 109 ("Decisions of district courts and
Courts of Appeals (often analogizing cell phones to the earlier pager technology) trend heavily in
favor of finding that the search incident to arrest or exigent circumstances exceptions apply to
searches of the contents of cell phones.").
173. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
174. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 ('A laptop and its storage devices have the potential to
contain vast amounts of information. People keep all types of personal information on computers,
including diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and financial records."' (quoting
United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 523 F.3d 941 (9th
Cir. 2008), amended by 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008))).
175. See Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, WarrantlessSearches, and the New Frontier of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 183, 213 (2010). Smartphones allow
users to place calls, send text messages, email, browse the Web, take pictures, listen to music, watch
video, and maintain financial records. See id A home or business computer allows a user to perform
all of the same functions but requires the user to remain in one location.
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There are few cases to date addressing the situation where police have
searched a laptop incident to arrest or without a warrant,176 with the exception of
border search cases where law enforcement searched laptops without any
reasonable suspicion under the border search doctrine. 77 Typically in order to
search a computer, police obtain a separate warrant, 178 a blanket warrant or affix
an affidavit to the warrant specifically including the computer or computer
records,179 or consent of the computer's owner to search the computer (which
must be more than general consent to search the home or premises). Thus, if a
South Carolina court found that a smartphone resembles a computer rather than
an early cell phone, then the court also would hold that smartphones should be
analyzed under a stricter luggage-type analysis.
1. Smartphones More Closely Resemble Computers than Early Cell
Phones
Courts have not directly confronted the issue of how to treat laptops and
smartphones. In many cases, police take the safe approach and obtain separate
search warrants for the smartphones.
Consequently, the discussion among
courts that does exist is often in the form of dicta because the issue is not
dispositive in the case.1 82 In other cases, courts have not had to address the issue
because only a preliminary search of the phone was conducted before police
obtained a search warrant.183 Nonetheless, these cases demonstrate that law

176. See id.at 215.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Arnold has
failed to distinguish how the search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any different

from the suspicionless border searches of travelers' luggage that the Supreme Court and we have
allowed."), amended by 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). The border search doctrine allows law
enforcement officers to search containers at the border without 'particularized suspicion." Id. at
945.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Saferstein, Crim. No. 07-CR-557, 2009 WL 1162863, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2009) (noting that three separate supporting affidavits were issued for a laptop
computer, iPhone, and iPod).
179. See State v. Sullivan, 281 S.C. 522, 524, 316 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1984) (noting that even an
affidavit accompanying a warrant that says generally "[a] computer listing of 1981 state tax returns"
will suffice).
180. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that consent to
search the apartment did not allow police to search the computer because the warrant gave
permission to search only the "premises and property located at 3225 Canterbury #10").
181. See, e.g., Saferstein, 2009 WL 1162863, at *2 (noting that after obtaining several other
search warrants, FBI agents obtained a separate warrant for "a laptop computer, Apple iPhone, and

Apple iPod"); United States v. Lemke, Crim. No. 08-216(1) (DWF/RLE), 2008 WL 4999246, at *7
(D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2008) (noting that police obtained a warrant for an iPhone found on the person
of an arrestee).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Corleto, No. 2:08-CR-585 TS, 2009 WL 274488, at *4 (D.
Utah Feb. 5, 2009) (noting that authorities obtained a separate warrant before searching the iPhone).
183. See, e.g., id. (stating that two computers and an iPhone were seized during a search and
that after a preliminary search, the officer obtained a separate search warrant for the iPhone and
computer).
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enforcement officers are taking precautionary steps by treating smartphones like
laptops and computers when applying for search warrants.
2.

PotentialGuidancefrom Courts in DeterminingHow to Analyze the
Smartphone Issue

In United States v. Carroll,185 a suspect was charged with possession of
marijuana. 186 Carroll sought to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his
BlackBerry, which was obtained when he, accompanied by counsel, went to the
police station to surrender voluntarily. 187 When he surrendered, Carroll had a
188
backpack, in which the officers found a BlackBerry.
They then examined and
189
recorded the BlackBerry's contacts list.
A United States District Court
concluded that Carroll's expectation of privacy was relevant to determining
whether the search of his Blackberry without a warrant was lawful but chose not
to decide the issue. 190 The court acknowledged that "other courts [had] reached
varying conclusions on whether searches of an arrestee's mobile phone is a
lawful search incident to arrest, and if so, how far that lawful search may
extend." 191 However, the court declined to answer the question and asked for
192
more briefing from the parties because neither had fully briefed the issue.
Carroll declined to have an evidentiary hearing, and a magistrate judge denied
193
Carroll's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the BlackBerry.
In a
straightforward analysis, the magistrate judge held that the backpack was within
Carroll's reach, placing it within the Chimel principle of particular justification
and allowing law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search to prevent
the arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying evidence. 194 Moreover, the
magistrate judge distinguished Park, in which the search of a cell phone after
arrest was held to be unconstitutional, because in Park,the search occurred an
hour and a half after the 195
arrest, while in Carroll, the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest.

184.
185.
186.
187.

See id.
537 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1294.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1299 n.9, 1300.
191. Id. at 1299. As evidenced by the interchangeable use of the terms BlackBerry and mobile
phone, the Carroll court seemed to treat a BlackBerry like any other mobile phone or early cell
phone. See id.
at 1299-300. One potential reason for this lack of distinction was that the court saw
no difference between the two devices. Another explanation, however, is that the court was not
forced to address this question because the search was limited to only the contacts list, which is also
a function of early cell phones. See id.
at 1294, 1299.
192. Id. at 1300.
193. Id. at 1301-02.
194. Id.at 1301 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
195. Id.at 1302.
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In United States v. Murphy,196 law enforcement officers searched a cell
phone with functions presumably similar to those of a smartphone. 197 The
defendant made several arguments that attempted to draw distinctions between
older cell phones and more modem cell phones-similar to the distinction today
between a typical cell phone and a smartphone. 198 Murphy was convicted of
narcotics and currency-related offenses after police stopped the vehicle he was
riding in for speeding. 199 Murphy argued that the evidence obtained from the
warrantless search of the phone should be suppressed because there was no
evidence that the information on the phone was volatile in nature and, therefore,
no threat that the evidence would be destroyed.20 0 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the need to preserve
evidence justifies the retrieval of call records and text messages without a
warrant during a search incident to arrest.2 0 1 Murphy also argued that police
officers should be able to search only cell phones with small storage capacities
without a warrant and that cell phones with large storage capacities should be
precluded from any search incident to arrest.20 2 The court simply rejected this
argument as unworkable because it would not be possible for an officer to
differentiate between a cell phone with a large storage capacity and a cell phone
203
with a small storage capacity.
Moreover, the court stated that information on a
cell phone with a large storage capacity could still be volatile because even those
phones have limited storage space and an incoming call or message could
destroy valuable evidence.
In Murphy, the court seemed to acknowledge that there are differences
between various cell phones, such as storage capacity, which impact the

196. 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
197. See id. at 409-12. It is not clear from the opinion what type of cell phone was searched.
However, this case is very recent, and based on the defendant's argument that a distinction should
be made between cell phones with large storage capacities and cell phones with small storage
capacities, presumably his cell phone fit into the former category rather than the latter. See id. at
411. This categorization would be analogous to smartphones and similar modem cell phones.
Although Murphy did not provide the court with any evidence that his cell phone had a large
storage capacity, the court assumed that it did for the purpose of its analysis. Id.
198. See id. at 411 ("Murphy argues that whether a cell phone may be searched without a
warrant can be determined only upon the officers ascertaining the cell phone's storage capacity.").
The court discussed the storage capacity of cell phones and the volatility of the information on the
cell phone. Id. Volatile means that evidence on the phone could be destroyed by unexpected
incoming calls or messages, as was the case with early cell phones and pagers with very limited
storage capacities. See id.
199. Id. at 407. In the course of the investigation following the stop, Murphy provided several
false names and was arrested for obstruction ofjustice. Id. at 408.
200. Id. at 409-11.
201. Id. at 411.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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probability that evidence on the phone could be destroyed. However, the court
206
was also very dismissive of these distinctions.
In spite of this, the smartphone
analysis is much more complex than merely drawing conclusions based on a
phone's storage capacity. Smartphones hold more information than early cell
phones and, more importantly, hold information different from the information
on early cell phones-information similar to what persons store on their personal
computers.
In United States v. McCray,20 7 a United States magistrate judge examined
issues surrounding the search of a cell phone's camera function, 2 0" a common
feature of modern cell phones and smartphones. 0 9 The defendant, whom police
"charged with sexual exploitation of children and possession of child
pornography.... filed a motion to suppress images found in his mobile phone at
the time of his arrest." 2 10 Officers were called to an apartment complex,
responding to reported sexual activity occurring in a vehicle.2 11 After police
discovered McCray with a fourteen-year-old female, officers spotted two rocks
of crack cocaine in the vehicle's ashtray in plain view and placed McCray under
arrest.212 While searching the vehicle further during the inventory process, police
discovered a Polaroid of a naked adult female, and based on the picture and the
cocaine, police suspected that McCray may have used his cell phone's camera to
take pictures of the minor female or for drug dealing activity.213 Without a
warrant, an officer accessed the phone's photo directory and discovered several
214
lewd images of the minor female.
After citing Robinson for the proposition that police may search the
arrestee's person to preserve evidence,F15 the court cited a number of cases where
other courts extended the search incident to arrest doctrine to electronic storage
devices. 216 The court emphasized that the officer only "briefly reviewed the
images stored in the phone's memory." 2 17 Moreover, relying on Finley, the court
stated that a cell phone is a container that stores information "that may have

205. See id. (discussing the distinctions between cell phones with large and small storage
capacities).
206. See id.
207. No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009).
208. Id.at *2. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report. Id.at * 1.
209. See Eve Sullivan, Gadgets-ForEveryday Photography, Cell Phones Becoming Camera
of Choice, GADGETS.TMCNET.COM, July 8, 2008, http://gadgets.tmcnet.com/topics/gadgets/
articles/33393-everyday-photography-cell-phones-becoming-camera-choice.htm ("96.3 percent of
adult cell phone owners report that they have a cell phone with a camera . .
210. McCray, 2009 WL 29607, at *1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.at *2.
214. Id.
215. Id.(citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
216. Id.at *3.The court noted that "[m]ore recent cases have treated mobile telephones and
digital cameras in the same manner." Id.
217. Id.at *4.
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great evidentiary value" and that the information contained on a cell phone
"might easily be destroyed., 218 The court concluded that "incident to a person's
arrest, a mobile phone or beeper may be briefly inspected to see if it contains
evidence relevant to the charge for which the defendant has been arrested,"
analogizing a brief search of a cell phone to thumbing through an address book
or papers. 2 19 The court acknowledged that the issue of "whether a cell phone (a
kind of computer capable of storing vast amounts of data) may be subjected to a
comprehensive search incident to a defendant's arrest for a sample traffic
violation" would be a more troublesome question.220 Nonetheless, the court's
strained analogy between a brief search of the camera function of a cell phone
and a search of an address book demonstrates the court's view of modem cell
phones as containers immediately associated with the person of an arrestee.
IV. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS IF THE SMARTPHONE AND SEARCH
INCIDENT To ARREST DOCTRINE ARISES IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

Implicationsfor the Future and a Recommendation for South Carolina
Courts

South Carolina courts may follow a restrictive approach when dealing with
smartphones, as have a few of their counterparts throughout the country. For
example, in State v. Smith,22 1 the Ohio Supreme Court held that modem cell
phones and smartphones do not qualify as closed containers under the Fourth
Amendment because, like all electronic containers, cell phones do not "actually
222
have physical objects within [them]," as required by Belton. Based on this
reasoning, the court found that cell phones and smartphones cannot be searched
without a warrant absent a need to protect the safety of the officer or protect
evidence from "imminent destruction,, 223 which was in line with the Chimel
principle of particular justification and the Chadwick rationale. In Smith, the
court held that the warrantless search was impermissible because at least a
portion of the search occurred while police officers had reduced the phone to
their exclusive control, eliminating the danger that the arrestee could destroy
evidence on the phone. 224 This situation is analogous to the search of the
footlocker in Chadwick. The court also rejected analogies of cell phones and
smartphones to address books and laptop computers, stating that cell phones "are

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id. at *4 & n.4.
Id. at *4 n.4.
920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
Id. at 954 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)).

223. Id. at 955. In this case the court stated that Smith's phone was not a smartphone but
stated that "Smith's cell phone had phone, text messaging, and camera capabilities." Id. at 954. The
court went on to call Smith's phone a "modern 'standard"' phone. Id.
224. Id. at 950, 955.
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more intricate and multifunctional than traditional address books, yet they are
still, in essence, phones, and thus they are distinguishable from laptop
computers." 225 However, the court stated that even though "cell phones cannot
be equated with laptop computers," the ability of modem cell phones and
smartphones "to store large amounts of private data gives their users a
reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the
information they contain." 226 This is similar to the heightened expectation of
privacy individuals have in a footlocker, as discussed in Chadwick and Sanders.
Consequently, Smith demonstrates the possibility that a South Carolina court
could hold that even basic modem cell phones, and certainly smartphones, give
rise to a heightened level of expectation of privacy, similar to that in the
footlocker in Chadwick.
In the broader search incident to arrest context, the Fourth Circuit has
demonstrated that it will apply a straightforward analysis of Arizona v. Gant. The
Gant decision signifies a return to the original rationales in Chimel and does so
in large part on expectation of privacy grounds. 227 If Gant signifies a return to a
Fourth Amendment rooted in the expectation of privacy, then courts may place
more weight on the expectation of privacy people have in their smartphones, as
did the Ohio Supreme Court in Smith.
If the issue arises in South Carolina, South Carolina courts should follow the
United States Supreme Court's return to the expectation of privacy
underpinnings in the Fourth Amendment and a narrow view of the search
incident to arrest doctrine in Gant. In doing so, South Carolina courts should
keep in mind the heightened expectation of privacy people have in their
smartphones, with a view towards the Chadwick analysis, as did the Ohio
Supreme Court in Smith.
Justin M Wolcott

225. Id. at 955.
226. Id.
227. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) ("A rule that gives police the power to
conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is
no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.").
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